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nations. The complaint, in brief, is that emphasis on narrative structure situates historical practice too close to the writing of fiction. So the category of narrative explanation is rejected given the nature of narrative and its contrast to the purpose of historical inquiry.
Notice that the objections require only the assumption that history is a nonfiction discipline. This hardly seems disputable. Yet, if non-fiction, history either is a science or it is not. If it is, then narrative explanations will not do for formal or methodological reasons. But suppose, if you wish, that history is not sciencelike. Perhaps the nature of historical inquiry is only to provide an understanding of events. To invoke a traditional distinction, history is an idiographic and not a nomothetic discipline. Historians, on this account, study unique and nonrepeating occurrences, or, at least, what is unique about events.1
Yet even on this conception of history, a question remains concerning how to verify a narrative. And the issue of verification does not intersect, in any obvious or interesting way, with the issue of narrative form. The extent to which history respects canons of narrative construction might influence the literary merit of that history. But it hardly seems relevant to determining the conditions under which that history is true. Thus, whether the emphasis of an historian's task is taken to be explanation or is defined as understanding, verificationist concerns seem to rule out the relevance of narrative form.
Both of these objections, I argue, are ill-founded. The reasons in each case are quite different. The methodological objection and the dispute regarding the status of historical explanation can be disposed of by undercutting the view of knowledge which motivates it. The metaphysical objection is more subtle and stubborn. It is with this objection that I am primarily concerned. What is metaphysical about the objection is that it assumes a correspondence theory of historical knowledge. This assumption, I argue, is incoherent.
A consequence of rejecting this correspondence view is that it no longer makes sense to speak of historical narratives as true or false. At first blush, this sounds troubling. I suggest why, properly understood, it is not. Concluding considerations related to the suggested logic of narrative explanation are meant to illuminate why the failure of narrative form as such to be true or false engenders no special problem for assessing the objectivity or explanatory utility of narratives qua explanations. The methodological objection, this suggests, is not tied to the viability of some particular model of scientific explanation, such as the covering-law model; the issue is what disciplines yield knowledge. Hempel's remark points to the fact that behind the old debate on the applicability of the covering-law model to history is the unity-of-method thesis. Positivism attempted to legislate to the republic of letters a general criterion of what could count as knowledge. Is there still a basis for mandating that some one form or other is, for example, the form of explanation? The failures of positivism remain a source of important and instructive lessons. Perhaps the most instructive failure can be seen in the history of the efforts, beginning with Carnap's Aufbau and continuing to Hempel's "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive Significance: Problems and Changes," to provide a reconstruction of scientific knowledge by their own standards. Positivism was done in by its own best advocates. It ceased to be a viable research program not for reasons tangential to its concerns, such as an inability to provide a plausible reconstruction of historical explanation. The failure took place at the heart, in the discovery that its methods were inadequate and inappropriate to characterize scientific explanation. The broader epistemological objections later developed by Quine and by Sellars argued convincingly that the problems are irremediable.
Why insist on the
The question of what to count as an explanation becomes, in part, a question of the use of this term. The methodological objection assumes that a proper subset of disciplines ought to serve to define for the rest what this standard is. This debate on explanation has interesting parallels to the problem I have elsewhere termed the Rationalitatstreit.3 This problem concerns whether standards of rationality vary radically or whether one may insist, following Martin Hollis, on the "epistemological unity of mankind." Each side of this debate, I maintain, is committed to a view I dubbed "methodological exclusivism."4 Exclusivists (of whatever stripe) presume that there is exactly one correct methodological approach to a subject matter. Yet, once the philosophical presumptions of methodological exclusivism are exposed, exclusivism loses its appeal.
As to explanation, it is worth reminding ourselves there is no good reason to believe that there is just one correct explication of the notion of explanation. Such claims to explication come to have a purely stipulative or legislative force in the absence of some notion of analyticity.
My suggestion has been that the methodological objection presupposes the plausibility of some exclusivist explication of explanation. These explications appeal, in the case at hand, either to the unity-of-method thesis or some implicit notion of analytic equivalence. Only by presupposing such problematic philosophical doctrines does one justify demands either for countenancing or failing to countenance narrative as a form of explanation. Indeed, there is no clear candidate for the title of the logic of explanation. describing history as narrative suggests -and I assume is meant to suggest -that historiography is to be compared with telling a tale or story. This is misleading even when applied to the most traditional histories. A historian dealing with any subject matter must first attempt to discover what occurred in some segment of the past, and establish how these occurrences were related to one another. Once this research has been carried forward to a partial conclusion, he must, of course, think about how he will best present his findings, and this ... may be regarded as "constructing a narrative." Such a narrative, however, is not independent of his antecedent research, nor is that research merely incidental to it; the historian's "story" -if one chooses to view it merely as a story -must emerge from his research and must be assumed to be at every point dependent on it. of these parts. In speaking of the constitutive parts of a series of events, I refer to the fact that when a historian seeks to understand the nature of and changes in a society . . . he is dealing with a complex whole, some of whose parts he already knows. It is these parts-and any others whose existence he uncovers-that are parts of the whole. .. . Thus, one can see that whenever a historian correctly analyzes the structures present in a society, or whenever he gives correct information as to the sequence of changes that it ... has undergone, he has dealt with events that belong together because they are the parts of the continuing whole.
Such a whole is not formed merely because the historian has defined his subject matter in a certain way and has confined the scope of his inquiry to what occurred with respect to that particular subject matter. . . . Rather, the events that he includes as belonging within the series of occurrences with which he is to deal are those between which he finds inherent connections because they have influenced one another.6
Mandelbaum's guiding analogy is likening history to mapmaking.7 Both maps and histories may differ in terms of scale, scope, detail. Both may be subject to change over time. However, histories, like maps, are guides over existing terrains:
one may hold that a basic structure is imposed on a historical account by the evidence on which it rests; the existence of lacunae in that evidence, and the new questions that are present in it, direct the historian's attention to the need for further evidence of a specific kind.... Thus, whatever evidence is originally available to a historian will not be an inchoate mass, and the more evidence there is, the less choice he will have as to the alternative ways in which he may reasonably structure his account.8 It is on the basis of the connections inherent in the evidence with which historians work that they can propose concrete causal analyses of the events with which they deal.9
Historical pictures are successively filled in by collecting more evidence concerning the events of interest. The picture is always partial; but what history provides is an ever clearer picture of things as they actually were. The past exists in itself; in Louis Mink's phrase, it exists as an "untold story."10 A history is, of course, more than a mere chronicle. But the work of an historian, in Mandelbaum's conception, is more like that of a scribe than an author. The sort of metaphysical assumption which underwrites Mandelbaum's rejection of narrative, however philosophically tenuous Mandelbaum's own exposition of it, has deep intuitive roots. It is anchored in an intuition that, as Mink puts it, "the story of the past needs only to be communicated, not constructed."'I What needs to be rejected is the picture of a past that is simply there waiting for an historian to come along. Construing history on the model of narrative appears inappropriate so long as the historian's art is assumed to consist in chipping off the excrescences of time so that the past can stand revealed.
The assumption on which the metaphysical objection is predicated is difficult For there is a class of descriptions of any event under which the event cannot be witnessed, and these descriptions are necessarily and systematically excluded from the I. C. The whole truth concerning an event can only be known after, and sometimes only long after the event itself has taken place, and this part of the story historians alone can tell. It is something even the best sort of witness cannot know."7
Danto's characterization of narrative sentences is ingenious and, I believe, correct. But how does any of this bear on the metaphysical objection with which I began? It is relevant in the following way. Recall that I claimed that this objection to narratives as a form of explanation takes its force not from the sort of flat-footed exposition which one finds in Mandelbaum, but from the intuition behind that exposition, the sort of intuition captured in Nietzsche's remark that the past is a rock you cannot move. The past is there. But if the fixity of the past is a coherent notion, as it seems to be, then this implies that there could be an Ideal Chronicle. Danto, for one, explicitly draws this conclusion in a passage I cited above. And even Danto betrays more allegiance to this notion of a fixed past than he otherwise claims to have by suggesting, as noted above, that the whole truth of an event might be known.
No matter that an Ideal Chronicle lacks narrative sentences; that is not the issue which now concerns us. If the past is fixed, if it is a story waiting to be told, then it must be logically possible to have some chronicle of it of the sort Danto imagines. What I argue is that the notion of an Ideal Chronicle is not coherent, and so we must reject as well the metaphysical picture which implies it.
The critical difficulty with the notion of an Ideal Chronicle is hinted at in the following passage from Mink. Mink is, I suggest, right in sensing a difficulty, but he does not develop an argument. In order, then, to make the problem explicit, imagine the I. C. at work. What does the I. C. record? Danto's suggestion is everything, and at once at that. But in agreeing that the I. C. can write anything at all we have, in a Wittgensteinian sense, been tricked; the very first step is the fatal one. The conjuring trick is complete once one concedes that there is anything for an Ideal Chronicler to record. What is the basic unit of the posited perfect record? They are events of every sort: visits home, heartbeats, a first kiss, the jump of an electron from one orbital position to another. But, as we know, events may be sliced thick or thin; a glance may be identified as an isolated event or as an instance in an event. What the unit-event is depends on the telling of it. Given the instructions to record "everything that happens, as it happens," the problem is not that there is too much for an Ideal Chronicler to record; the irony is that there are no things in the abstract to be recorded. An Ideal Chronicler never gets started because there are no ideal events to chronicle.
What sort of things are events? On one standard account, events are identified only under a description. A reason for worrying whether events exist in some philosophically relevant sense of that term -that is, whether they count as legitimate objects of discourse -is that assuming their existence proves a convenience for the purposes of explicating the logical form of sentences about actions. Countenancing events facilitates the ability to draw permissible inferences which otherwise cannot be readily managed if events are ruled out as individuated objects.
To show, then, that my claim of a paragraph back does not simply beg the question against events as objects, consider someone such as Davidson who has argued for tolerating such an ontology. 19 But a Davidsonian ontology does not help the Ideal Chronicler with her task. Without some description or other, there are no specific events; with an identifying description, we still do not know if the event is of the requisite ideal sort-that is, not primarily of our making.
The specification of identity conditions does not solve the problem of underdetermination which has bedeviled philosophers of science. There is no unique physical theory entailed by the available evidence; incompatible theories can be formulated compatible with whatever data is at hand. My point about putative "ideal events" -those recounted in some Ideal Chronicle -is that treating such events as objects independent of our object (and event) positing scheme of things runs afoul of what we know about the relation of evidence to theory. The very possibility of an Ideal Chronicle presumes not just identity conditions for events, but their existence apart from our theoretical specification of them. But it is precisely this realist inference which is unjustified by any set of identity conditions for events and which, given the problem of the underdetermination of theories, is patently unjustifiable.
The problem is, of course, not ameliorated by shifting to some set of identity 19 . See, for example, essays 1, 6-10 in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford, 1980). conditions for events other than Davidson's. Let events be as well individuated as you please; as noted, I grant we might even be allowed to quantify them (meaning, in non-philosophic jargon, that events are treated on a par with individual objects). This does not change the problem. The objection arose not because of some inability to identify events, but due to a question about the status of these events apart from some object-(or event-) positing scheme or other. The issue is their metaphysical status, whether or not we may presume some correspondence between our talk of events and events-in-themselves. To assume that logically adequate identity conditions for events is tantamount to proving that this is how things must be with the world is, of course, to beg the question at issue.
Events simpliciter cannot be shown to exist; they are not known to be of nature's making rather than of ours. Events exist only by proxy. This is why one cannot presume that there are any ideal events for our erstwhile chronicler to chronicle; knowledge of events is restricted to happenings isolated under descriptions provided by interested parties. This way of putting the matter is tantamount to denying my first premise -the claim that events are not natural entities and exist only under a description. The problem, as I originally developed it, does not assume that some fact is left out; the problem is a failure of people to agree on what counts as the event to be described. Is there a way to include all events and exclude the descriptions of human agents?
Can this problem be solved by augmenting the
Boethius imagined that God saw everything at once; all actions at all times stood revealed simultaneously to God. Certainly this is a way of capturing all that happens. Moreover, the advantage of a Boethian Chronicler is that this person need not rely, or so I shall assume, on potentially conflicting descriptions. This account, however, still will not do, not even if we cut it down so that at time t, everything up to and including what is happening at t stands so revealed to the Ideal Chronicler. The problem is that the Boethian vision, though comprehensive, still does not contain events, or, alternatively, it contains just one event, the total picture at t.
The past so pictured presents not a chronicle, moreover, but a Jamesian buzzing, booming confusion. Put another way, the identification of events from the Boethian tapestry of the past requires separating the simultaneous presentation of happenings which Boethius imagined into particular strands, the ones that interest us. God may see everything at once; an Ideal Chronicler, within a temporal limit, may do the same, or so I asked you to imagine. But this chronicle gives us less than we have even now. It is not just that there might be a need to factor in cultural conditioning and personal quirks when discussing what we see; seeing is not perceiving, not in any simple sense. The basic problem is more elementary than that. When we view a snapshot or read a page of a book, if the object is not at the proper distance from our eyes, in appropriate light, and so on, we cannot see what we want to see. If someone pushes the book or picture up so it touches our nose, we see something -but not, for example, the picture of the picnic or the story of the latest Reagan gaffe. Given the Boethian view, the Ideal Chronicler is in just this position, or leaves us in this position when consulting the resulting tapestry of happenings. The Boethian Chronicler has no natural point of focus. But without a focus, either nothing appears -the booming, buzzing confusion-or God-knows-what looms before us, like the photo pressed too close for one to view. Total information gives us less than we need to know.
Given the Boethian picture, it does not follow that human beings could say anything about it at all. Chronicles presuppose categorizations of time and events, and there is no reason to believe the Boethian account could be a chronicle. Nothing in that account, filled though it is with every conceivable happening, entails that there are humanly identifiable events arranged in recognizable order. If events are picked out by human agents, the chronicle is not ideal; if the world is viewed from the eye of God, there is no chronicle. A Boethian chronicle cuts things too coarsely to solve the problem of identifying events in an objective way.
The point at which the discussion has arrived is this: if events are individuated by some favored set of identity conditions, the notion of there being an ideal chronicle self-destructs; such a chronicle is logically impossible. If we imagine the chronicle along Boethian lines, the notion still cannot be made cogent, for the Boethian image cannot be translated into the form of a chronicle.
But perhaps the Boethian picture is a start. It is, at least, complete. The problem is to find a finer grained description of matters uninfected by conflicting descriptions; this would preserve the metaphysical assumption that the past exists objectively as an untold story.
Problems arise, we just noted, if there is total information and no categories by which to organize and focus viewing. Perhaps a solution to this problem is a Carnapian Chronicler. The C. C., let us imagine, defines a language -ideal-in-L -which contains rules and definitions such that, given certain state descriptions, Ideal-in-L permits the derivation of the event which took place. Consistency is thus assured and no ambiguity threatens. But this is no Ideal Chronicle in the desired respect. The question of which events exist has now been relegated to the status of an internal question; the existence of events is explicitly relativized to a particular set of rules. This preserves consistency, but it defeats the purpose of positing the chronicle. The purpose is to explicate how to construct a complete and objective record of the past. The correspondence theory of historical truth remains unvindicated by appeal to a Carnapian Chronicler.
The only refinement on the matter I have left to suggest would be to limit the Ideal Chronicler's task. Do the problems abate if we imagine an Ideal Boswell? The task is cut down by giving I. B. the more modest task of compiling a complete record for a single individual. If history is, as Carlyle claimed, but so many biographies, then the I. B. would preserve the metaphysical assumption. But, alas, the Ideal Boswell too produces only a blur. The root of the problem is not in the scope of the enterprise but in its completeness. Unless we equip I. B. with our categories, there are no recognizable events. But if equipped with our categories, he ceases to be ideal. He is just one of us, albeit a tad more compulsive. I conclude that the notions of an Ideal Chronicle and an Ideal Chronicler cannot be coherently fleshed out, and so the metaphysical objection fails.
Viewing the world sub specie aeternitatis, an ideal chronicler is imagined to see events bare, shorn of the misperceptions and oversights to which mere mortals are prone. In particular, historical events are conceived as having their own pristine ontological integrity. Caesar crosses the Rubicon in 49 B.C. or he does not; if true, the chronicler notes it and if not, not. (The dating here makes this a narrative sentence, but this complication can be ignored.) A disinterested chronicle seems impossible. The core of my complaint has been that it is the pretense to disinterestedness and completeness which makes Danto's fiction ultimately incoherent. Given the lofty God's-eye perspective, no events appear. A less lofty perspective defeats the purpose of the literary conceit. The philosophical moral is one pressed by philosophers from Kant to Davidson. We may query the world and learn a great deal, but it is a confusion to think that the categories in which the questions are posed and the answers framed constitute, to paraphrase Rorty, History's Own Vocabulary.
My primary concern throughout has been with prima facie objections to the notion of a narrative explanation. My handling of these objections, even if convincing, is as yet no delineation, however, of what counts as a proper narrative explanation. My concluding remarks are, in this regard, only programmatic.
Histories ought to contain only true statements. What remains problematic is the narrative structure which presents the verifiable statements as steps in a process which effects change. The facts with which an historian works may be, in Hayden White's term, emplotted in various ways.20 White, as is well known, claims that there are basic narrative strategies -fundamental tropes -for emplotting events, and that these incompatible forms of emplotment are products of the historian's art in telling about the events. There is no truth-value, for example, to the statement that such and such a happening is tragic; there is only a telling which so presents it.21 Insofar as events and processes are artifacts of different strategies of emplotment, the narrative is neither true nor false in any sense congruent with the correspondence theory.
Narratives are constrained by the facts, since they are constructed from verifiable statements. They are subject to objective evaluation because, as both White and Gene Wise argue, narrative forms in history must function as methodological paradigms. Paradigms, in the methodological sense, provide problem-solving models and, as a consequence, function to direct research.22 Narrative forms can, then, be judged relative to their fruitfulness in guiding research and their resources for solving problems. 
